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NOTES 
INCOME TAX-CAPITAL GAINS TAX-Meaning of 
"More Than 80 Percent in Value of the 
Outstanding Stock" Under Section 1239 
The sale of property by a tax.payer to a corporation which he 
controls has been a frequently attempted method of tax reduction 
for more than thirty years.1 Such a transaction has the advantage of 
maintaining ownership of the property in virtually the same hands, 
while at the same time resulting in a substantial mitigation of tax 
liability. For instance, in the post-World War II period, when prop-
erty values were generally increasing, a tax.payer could sell to his 
controlled corporation at a gain depreciable property with a basis 
lowered by adjustments for prior depreciation allowances.2 The gain 
was immediately tax.able at the capital gains rate,3 but the sale price 
established a new basis for depreciation for the controlled corpora-
tion, which, in subsequent years, permitted substantial annual depre-
ciation deductions from income taxable at ordinary income rates.4 
The resulting savings in income taxes often outweighed the initial 
payment of the capital gains tax on the sale.5 To preclude this 
method of tax avoidance, 6 section 1239 of the Internal Revenue 
I. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1934); 78 CoNG. REc. 2511 (remarks 
of Representative Dougton), 5847-48 (remarks of Senator Harrison) (1934). 
2. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 167, 1016. 
3. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 123l(a). The kind of property to which this section is 
applicable is partly set out in subsection (b), and includes the depreciable property to 
which section 1239 is applicable. 
4. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167(a). 
5. H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1951): 
Thus, in effect, the immediate payment of a capital gains tax has been substituted 
for the elimination, over a period of years, of the corporate income taxes on an 
equivalent amount. The substantial differential between the capital-gains rate and 
the ordinary rates makes such a substitution highly advantageous when the sale 
may be carried out without loss of control over the asset . . . . 
The opportunity for tax mitigation may be shown by a hypothetical example: The 
transferor holds property the basis of which has been reduced by depreciation deduc-
tions to $2,000. He sells the property for $6,000 to his controlled corporation, paying 
the maximum capital gains tax of 25% on the $4,000 gain ($1,000). After a few years 
the basis of the property is again reduced by the corporation's depreciation deductions 
to $2,000, during which time the corporation has been allowed to deduct $4,000 from 
ordinary income. If the corporation is in the 50% bracket, the $4,000 in depreciation 
deductions has saved the corporation $2,000 in income taxes. Thus, the transferor paid 
$1,000 in capital gains tax but saved $2,000 in income taxes, a net saving of approxi-
mately $1,000. See United States v. Parker, 376 F.2d 402, 407 n.5 (1967). 
6. S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 69-70 (1951); H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 
1st Sess. 26 (1951); 97 CONG. REc. 6918 (remarks of Representative Mills), 11739-40 (re-
marks of Senator Humphrey) (1951). 
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Code of 19547-first enacted as section 328 of the Revenue Act of 
195!8-provides for taxation of the initial gain at ordinary income 
rates, rather than the lower capital gains rates, when the transferor 
owns "more than 80 percent in value" of the transferee corporation's 
outstanding stock. Thus, the problem becomes one of determining 
whether a taxpayer owns "more than 80 percent in value of the out-
standing stock" of the transferee, that measure being the congression-
al definition of a controlled corporation for purposes of section 1239.0 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was 
squarely confronted with this problem in United States v. Parker.10 
The lower court had found, 11 and the Fifth Circuit agreed, that 
Parker owned exactly 80 percent, by numerical count, of the out-
standing shares of a corporation to which he had made a sale of de-
preciable property, the remaining 20 percent being owned by one 
other stockholder. However, the Fifth Circuit also agreed with the 
Tenth Circuit's recent statement in Harry Trotz v. Commissioner12 
that section 1239 does not contemplate a simple numerical count 
test; both courts felt that such a test would read the words "in value" 
out of the statute.13 The Fifth Circuit then enunciated a "block 
7. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1239: 
GAIN FROM SALE OF CERTAIN PROPERTY BETWEEN SPOUSES OR 
BETWEEN AN INDIVIDUAL AND A CONTROLLED CORPORATION. 
(a) Treatment of Gain as Ordinary lncome.-In the case of a sale or exchange, 
directly or indirectly, of property described in subsection (b)-
(1) between a husband and wife; or 
(2) between an individual and a corporation more than 80 percent in value of 
the outstanding stock of which is owned by such individual, his spouse, and his 
minor children and minor grandchildren; 
any gain recognized to the transferor from the sale or exchange of such property 
shall be considered as gain from the sale or exchange of property which is neither 
a capital asset nor property described in section 12!11. 
(b) Section Applicable Only to Sales or Exchanges of Depreciable Property.-This 
section shall apply only in the case of a sale or exchange by a transferor of prop• 
erty which in the hands of the transferee is property of a character which is subject 
to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167. 
(c) Section Not Applicable With Respect to Sales or Exchanges Made on or 
Before May 3, 1951.-This section shall apply only in the case of a sale or exchange 
made after May 3, 1951. 
8. 65 Stat. 504 (1951). 
9. In some cases § 1239 may be avoided completely by the use of either § 1245 or 
§ 1250, both of which, subject to certain limitations, tax the gain realized upon the 
sale of a depreciable asset as ordinary income. Under §§ 1245 and 1250, however, com• 
plete recovery of the realized gain as ordinary income cannot be accomplished if the 
sale price of the asset exceeds its original cost, if the asset is a building which has 
been held for more than one year, or if the asset is "section 1245" property acquired 
before 1962 or "section 1250" property acquired before 1964. Recent Development, Re-
tention of Control Over Stock Constitutes "Ownership" Under Section 12J9 of the 
Internal Revenue Code-Harry Trotz, 63 MicH. L. REV. 1504, 1505-06 (1965). 
IO. 376 F.2d 402 (5th Cir. 1967). 
11. 242 F. Supp. 117, 121 (W.D. La. 1965). 
12. 361 F.2d 927, 930 (10th Cir. 1966). 
13. The court noted that the dissimilar wording of the test for control of a corpo• 
ration in § 368(c) (' '[C]ontrol' means the ownership of stock possessing at least 80 per• 
cent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at 
least 80 percent of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of the cor-
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value" test, which was based upon a fair market evaluation of Par-
ker's block of shares. Finding that an 80 percent shareholder's con-
trol of corporate activities added some unquantified value to his 
block of shares, and that restrictions on the alienability of the 20 per-
cent shareholder's stock devalued those shares by an undetermined 
amount, the court concluded that Parker, by mvning 80 percent of 
the shares, owned something more than 80 percent in value of the 
shares.u The very difficult question of how much value was added to 
Parker's shares by these factors was happily avoided, that determi-
nation being unnecessary to the disposition of this particular case. 
Following the Fifth Circuit's decision in Parker, the Tax Court, 
in a memorandum opinion,16 decided the Trotz case on remand, ap-
plying, without so acknowledging,16 the block value test propounded 
by the Fifth Circuit in Parker. However, primarily because the trans-
feree corporation was not a "going concern," the Tax Court held 
that 79 percent of the shares, by numerical count, was 79 percent in 
value of the shares.17 
Although the test produced different results in the two cases, it 
is important to note that both courts applied essentially the same 
block value test. This test assumes initially that all shares in a given 
class of stock are of equal value.18 It then inquires whether any incre-
mental value need be attached to a taxpayer's block of shares in a 
hypothetical sale by reason of the number of shares that he owns or 
the relatively limited restrictions on the alienability of those shares.19 
Thus, the "block value" of a taxpayer's holdings is the sum of the 
value of the individual shares in the block plus the incremental value 
atising from the above-mentioned factors. 
poration.''), and the absence of any reference to that section in § 1239, as compared to 
§ 35l(a) which makes specific reference to the control test enunciated in § 368(c), indi-
cated that a different test was to be established in § 1239 than that found in § 368(c). 
376 F.2d at 407-08. 
14. Id. at 409. 
15. Harry Trotz, 1967 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. ,r 67,139 (1967). 
16. Although the Tax Court's opinion never mentioned the Fifth Circuit's decision 
in Parker, the Tax Court was likewise concerned with the "block value" of the tax-
payer's holdings and in connection therewith considered the same factors: majority 
control and restricted alienability. Thus, the conclusion seems inescapable that in Trotz 
the Tax Court applied the Parker "block value" test. 
17. 1967 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at ,r 67,139. 
18. In a case involving a corporation with multiple classes of stock, the "block 
value" test would have to determine the value per share of each of the separate classes 
of stock. 
19. Assume, for example, a corporation with 100 shares of stock value at $10 per 
share. An 80 percent holder ostensibly owns $800 worth of stock. Yet, he may be able 
to sell his 80 percent block for more than $800, the incremental value being a premium 
for control, unrestricted alienability, or a volume purchase. Thus, because of this in-
cremental block value, his individual shares are worth more than $10 per share when 
sold as part of his block. See Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal opportunity 
in the Sale of Shares, 78 HARV. L. R.Ev. 505 (1965); Jennings, Trading in Corporate 
Control, 44 CALIF. L R.Ev. 1 (1956). 
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There are persuasive reasons, however, for not using this "block 
value" test under section 1239. First, such a test provides no reliable or 
predictable guidelines for the taxpayer who attempts to plan his sale 
of depreciable property so as to receive the capital gains treatment 
allowed by section 1239. The 80 percent in value measure was pre-
sumably designed, at least in part, to give the taxpayer fair notice of 
what Congress considered to be a bona fide sale. Moreover, since the 
80 percent figure was apparently set as a convenient benchmark for 
administrative purposes, there is reason to suppose that Congress in-
tended a simple test with a minimum of litigation. It is thus not to 
be assumed that Congress intended a test so subjective as to place 
the taxpayer at the mercy of the Internal Revenue Service and the 
courts. Yet the block value test requires the taxpayer to determine 
the fair market value of his block in a situation where the means 
available to him for such a determination are so inadequate and un-
reliable that the 80 percent measure of section 1239 becomes hope-
lessly elusive. 
Normally, comparable sales of a corporation's own stock are the 
best indication of the fair market value of other stock in the same 
corporation.20 Yet section 1239 will ordinarily be applicable to closely 
held corporations, with respect to which sales of stock take place only 
infrequently, if at all.21 Moreover, the sales which do occur are gen-
erally dismissed as unrepresentative.22 Thus, the ta.'l:payer cannot 
look to actual sales of the stock of the corporation, or of other closely 
held corporations similarly situated,23 as a reliable indication of the 
fair market value of his holdings. Nor can he obtain a ruling from 
the Internal Revenue Service as to the value of his holdings, since 
the Service generally refrains from giving such rulings.24 Therefore, 
under the block value test, his only recourse is to an expert's opinion 
of the fair market value of his block of shares in a sale which is not 
going to take place in a market which does not exist.25 Moreover, the 
expert is necessarily confronted with the problem of measuring the 
incremental value which would accrue to the taxpayer's block in this 
hypothetical sale. As there are no guidelines whatever for this quan-
20. 10 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 59.11 (1943). 
21. Id. at § 59.25. 
22, Section 3.03, Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 Cmr. BULL. 237-38; Furst, Valuation of 
Closely Held Corporations, 47 WYBRAND J. No. 2, at I (1966); see Schnorbach v. Kava-
nagh, 102 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Mich. 1951). 
23. There is little likelihood that the few sales of stock of comparable closely held 
corporations will involve blocks of the same size as the taxpayer's, thereby adding more 
subjectivity to the incremental value determination. 
24. Hartwig, Valuation Problems Before the Internal Revenue Service and the Tax 
Courts, N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1143, 1159 (1955). 
25. See Dakin, Legal Aspects of the Valuation of Corporate Stocks of Closely Held 
Corporations, TULANE 6TH TAX INST. 379 (1957); Hartwig, supra note 24; Rice, The 
Valuation of Close Held Stocks: A Lottery in Federal Taxation, 98 U. PA. L, REv. 367 
(1950); Note, An Old Formula in New Attire, 11 TAX L. REv. 190 (1956). 
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tification of incremental value, the taxpayer is left with a completely 
subjective determination,26 with the result that a test based on the 
fair market value of a particular block of shares in a close corporation 
is incapable of providing fair notice.27 This result necessarily follows 
from the block value test, and unless one is to assume that Congress 
desired such uncertainty, another test must have been envisioned. 
Moreover, courts are in no better position than the taxpayer to 
measure the incremental value of a block of shares. Thus, a court 
could assign an arbitrary value to majority control and thereby could 
justify a conclusion that any taxpayer who owns between 50 and 80 
percent of the shares of a corporation owns "more than 80 percent 
in value" of the outstanding stock for purposes of section 1239. Not 
only does this judicial maneuverability have an adverse retroactive 
impact on the taxpayer, but it is inconsistent with the legislative his-
tory of section 1239. The Senate Finance Committee objected to the 
original wording of section 1239, which had established a test of "50 
percent in value,"28 because of its belief that with such a low stan-
dard the provision would deny capital gains treatment to some bona 
fide transactions.29 In response to the Senate's objections, the confer-
ence committee raised the measure from 50 to 80 percent.30 Yet, as 
indicated above, one of the effects of the block value test may be to 
include the 50 to 80 percent holder, which is apparently just what 
the Senate committee sought to avoid by insisting on a considerably 
higher standard than "half of the outstanding shares."31 
26. See IO J. MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 59.21-.26 (1943), which 
discusses the valuation of the basic per share value but which fails to suggest how in-
cremental value should be quantified. 
27. A hypothetical example will demonstrate what the taxpayer is up against when 
§ 1239 is interpreted to contemplate a "block value" test. Assume a taxpayer owns 60 
percent of the shares in a corporation to which the proposed sale of depreciable prop-
erty is to be made. The taxpayer's expert determines that majority control and unre-
stricted alienability each add 10 percent in incremental value to the basic value of the 
shares the taxpayer owns, thus concluding that the taxpayer owns 72 percent in value 
of the corporation's outstanding stock, apparently well without the "more than 80 
percent in value" limit of § 1239. Yet, if the court found that each of these factors 
added not 10 percent to the value of the taxpayer's block unit but 17 percent, the tax-
payer's 60 percent block of shares would equal "more than 80 percent in value." The 
taxpayer, believing himself to be well without the bounds of the "more than 80 per-
cent in value" measure by holding only 60 percent of the shares, finds himself paying 
the higher income rates because of a seven percentage point difference between the opin-
ion of his expert and that of the court. As the Central Trust v. United States case indi-
cates, a variance of seven percentage points between honest and qualified experts 
representing different interests is fully to be expected, given the hypothetical sale on 
the hypothetical market context in which § 1239 will normally be applicable. 305 F.2d 
393 (Ct. Cl. 1962). 
28. H.R. 4473, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). J. SEIDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FED-
ERAL INCOME AND ExCESS PROFITS TAX LAws (1953-1939) 1866 (1954). 
29. S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 70 (1951). 
30. J. SEIDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME AND ExCESS PROFITS TAX 
LAWS (1953-1939) 1866 (1954). 
31. Judging from its understanding that "50 percent in value" meant "half of the 
outstanding shares" (see note 42 infra and accompanying text), the Senate Finance 
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In response to the above objections, it tnight be argued that while 
a fair market evaluation of a block of shares in a closely held corpo-
ration is admittedly exceedingly difficult and subjective, such ap-
praisals are regularly undertaken in estate and gift tax cases. Revenue 
Ruling 59-6032 suggests that a block value test is appropriate for 
estate and gift tax purposes.33 Yet section 1239 would seem to require 
a more predictable standard than is needed in the estate and gift con-
text, since the "80 percent in value" measure was presumably de-
signed, at lea.st in part, as a standard by which businessmen could 
govern their actions. Moreover, the incremental value of a block of 
shares is a crucial factor in the estate and gift tax context, where the 
very object of the tax is the block of shares and the purpose of the ap-
praisal is to measure the total value passing into the hands of the new 
owner or owners.34 However, in the section 1239 situation, the 
ownership of shares is neither being taxed nor is it passing into new 
hands; it is merely being used as a measure of the substantiality of a 
particular shareholder's interest in a corporation to which he has sold 
depreciable property. In this connection, it should be recalled why 
section 1239 is concerned with the substantiality of a taxpayer's own-
ership share of a corporation. The section was designed to deny cap• 
ital gains treatment to those taxpayers whose ownership in a corpo-
ration is substantial enough to make it profitable for them to sell 
appreciated assets to the corporation and suffer the incident capital 
gains taxes35 solely for the purpose of permitting the corporation to 
take subsequent depreciation deductions. Given this design, it would 
seem that a test for substantiality or ownership should focus on the 
taxpayer's right to share in the earnings of the corporation, rather 
than on his control over corporate activities.36 Thus, the emphasis on 
control under the block value test appears to be misplaced. 
Committ~e mUst have believed that the 80 percent measure appearing in the revised 
bill would establish a standard a full 30 percent higher than half of the outstanding 
shares. 
32. 1959-1 GUM. Buu.. 237. 
33. There is, however, reason to doubt whether the Parker ''block value" test is 
appropriate even in the estate and gift tax context. This writer has found no estate 
or gift tax case which holds that an incremental value is to be added to a majority 
stockholder's block in a close corporation by reason of the size of his block. The "size 
of block" factor mentioned in Rev. Rul. 59-60 has instead been understood to con• 
template simply a digcount for lack of marketability of a minority block. See Central 
Trust v. United States, 305 F.2d 393 (Ct. Cl. 1962): Worthen v. United States, 192 
F, Supp. 127 (D. Mass. 1961); Bader v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. Ill. 1959). 
Such a discount would have been inappropriate in Parker, however, because the 80 
percent holder was contractually obligated to purchase the 20 percent holder's block 
whenever the minority holder wanted to sell, thereby creating a ready market for the 
20 percent holder. United States v. Parker, 376 F.2d 402 (1967). 
34. Rice, supra note 25. 
35. See note 3 supra. 
36. Indeed, if Congress contemplated a control test, it could easily have incorporated 
the test in § 368. See note 13 supra and accompanying text. 
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In view of these patent deficiencies of the block value test, it is 
surprising that the courts in the two principal cases settled on the 
same unsatisfactory standard. Both courts agreed that Congress must 
have intended more than a simple numerical count test by the de-
liberate use of the phrase "in value" in section 1239, since that lan-
guage would be rendered surplusage if a mere count of the shares 
had been contemplated. However, it is a numerical count test for 
which one finds the most support in the case authority and legislative 
history.37 The principal cases were the first in which the "80 percent 
in value" phrase was directly in controversy, but earlier courts apply-
ing section 1239 were necessarily confronted with the meaning of 
those words. Prior to the lower court decision in Parker, every such 
court had apparently assumed that the language called for a nu-
merical count of the outstanding shares.38 
This numerical count test finds additional support in the legisla-
tive history of section 1239. The provision when first submitted as 
section 328 of the Revenue Act of 1951 spoke of ''more than 50 per-
cent in value of the outstanding stock."39 In one of three references 
to the phrase in the House Ways and Means Committee Report the 
words "in value" are omitted.40 More significantly, the hypothetical 
examples included in the Committee Report to clarify the operation 
of the section apparently speak in terms of percentages based on a nu-
merical count.41 The Senate Finance Committee, although recom-
mending rejection of the entire section, understood "more than 50 
percent in value" to mean more than half of the outstanding stock.42 
The conference committee retained the section with the "in value'' 
language, altering the ownership rules and raising the measure from 
50 to 80 percent without ever indicating that the Senate's under-
standing of the test had been incorrect.43 
37. It should be noted that the Fifth Circuit produced no legislative history to 
support its "block value" test; furthermore, none of the cases citecl in support of the 
test involved § 1239. 
!18. E.g., United States v. Rothenberg, !150 F.2d 319 (10th Cir. 1965); Mitchell v. 
Commissioner, !100 F.2d 53!1 (4th Cir. 1962) (taxpayer owned 79.54% of stock): F. W. 
Dryborough, 42 T.C. 1029 (1964); Fontaine v. Patterson, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ,i 9790 
(N.D. Ala. 1962); Ainsworth v. United States, 60-2 U.S. Tax Cl\S, ,I 9595 (E.D. Wis. 
1960); Estate of Walter A. Krafft, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. ,i 61,!105 (1961), 
39. H.R. 4473, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); J. SEIDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF Fllll-
ERAL INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX LAws (1953-1939) 1866 (1954). 
40. H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1951). See STAFF OF JOINT COMlll. ON 
INTERNAL REvENUE TAXATION, SUMMARY OF PROVISIONXNG OF REvENuE Acr OF 1951, 82d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 35-36 (1951) (same omission). 
41. H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 120-21 (1951), 
42. S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 69 (1951): "The House Bill at-
tempted to eliminate the tax advantage , •• by denying c;apital gain treatment to the 
transferor with ,;espect to sales or exchanges of depreciable property • • • between an 
individual and a corporation more than half of the outstanding stock of which is owned 
by or !or him ••.• " 
43. H.R. REP, No. 1179, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1951). 
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Inquiry into the legislative history of section 267,44 the "spiritual 
ancestor"45 of section 1239, provides little insight into the meaning 
intended in Congress' first use of a "percentage in value" test. Sec-
tion 267 disallows the deduction for a loss resulting from the sale of 
property to a corporation of which the taxpayer owns "more than 50 
percent in value of the outstanding stock." The "in value" wording 
in section 267 replaced language in the original bill which provided 
for a numerical count of voting stock.46 While Congress unfortu-
nately did not elaborate on the intended meaning of the substituted 
phrase "in value,"47 the courts applying section 267 have consistently 
resorted to a numerical count test.48 Thus, with respect to section 
267, as perhaps with section 1239, the numerical count test was firmly 
entrenched in the case authority prior to the district court's decision 
in Parker. 
Given this apparent legislative and judicial recognition of the 
numerical count test, there is reason to question the premise of the 
courts in the principal cases that section 1239 calls for more than a 
mere count of the shares in all cases. Moreover, the basic assumption 
underlying this premise-that the employment of a numerical count 
test reads the phrase "in value" out of the statute-does not bear 
analysis. It is true that if section 1239 were only concerned with cor-
porations having a single class of stock, the words "in value" would 
not be necessary; for, assuming that any value added by control or a 
relative freedom from share transfer restrictions should not be taken 
into account, a mere percentage count of the shares would reach the 
same result as a more complicated computation based on a fair mar-
ket valuation of the corporation and of the taxpayer's shareholdings. 
However, the phrase "in value" is given content in the situation 
where the transferee corporation has more than one class of outstand-
ing stock, since in that case a mere count of the shares may not be 
sufficient. 
In a corporation with two or more classes of stock, a taxpayer 
could own well over 80 percent of the value of all the shares, without 
holding 80 percent, by numerical count, of the outstanding shares. 
44. !NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 267. 
45. 97 CONG. REc. 11740 (1951) (remarks of Senator Humphrey); Warren, Sales of 
Depreciated Properties to Related Entities, U. So. CAL. 1959 TAX INsr. 797. 
46. J. SEIDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HrsrORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAws (1938-1861) !116 
(1938). 
47. Three years later, however, the Ways and Means Committee issued hypothetical 
examples illustrating the ownership provision of § 267 which appear to be based on 
a numerical count of shares interpretation. H.R. REP. No. 1546, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 
27-29 (1937). 
48. E.g., Federal Cement Tile Co. v. Commissioner, 338 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1964); 
McCarty v. Cripe, 201 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1953); Gounares Bros. v. United States, 185 
F. Supp. 794 (S.D. Ala. 1960); Graves Bros., 17 T.C. 1499 (1952); Arizona Publishing Co., 
9 T.C. 85 (1947); Morris Inv. Corp., 5 T.C. 583 (1945); Hosch Bros., 3 T.C. 279 (1944); 
W. A. Drake Inc., 3 T.C. 33 (1944); Lakeside Irrigation, 41 B.T .A. 892 (1940); Norman 
Cooledge, 40 B.T .A. 110 (1939). 
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For example, if a taxpayer owns all 100 shares of a corporation's class 
A stock valued at ninety dollars per share but none of the 100 shares 
of class B stock worth ten dollars per share, a mere count of the shares 
would determine that he owns 50 percent of the shares, and, if this 
alone were the test, he could qualify for capital gains treatment un-
der section 1239. Assuming that earnings are distributed approxi-
mately in proportion to the value of the shares,49 this obviously 
would be an unsatisfactory result. Thus, with respect to a transferee 
corporation with more than one class of stock, a more sophisticated 
computation is required. First, the total value of each class of shares 
should be ascertained. 50 Emphasis should be placed on the extent to 
which each class of stock can share in the earnings of the corporation. 
Next, the total value of each class should be divided by the number 
of shares in the class to obtain the value per share. It is then a simple 
matter to determine the value of a taxpayer's ownership by multi-
plying the number of his shares in each class by the appropriate per 
share value. Finally, the taxpayer's percentage ownership "in value 
of the outstanding stock" is computed by dividing the value of his 
share holdings, as computed above, by the total value of all the out-
standing classes of stock.51 While the results of this computation are 
less predictable than those reached under the simpler computation 
in the single class situation, where actual evaluation is unnecessary, 
they are significantly more predictable than the results reached under 
the block value test, where the value added by control must be quan-
tified. Thus, the test outlined herein provides a workable standard 
for both the taxpayer and the courts, and is entirely consistent with 
the language of section 1239 and the legislative history.52 
Courts in the near future are going to be confronted with the 
49. See note 35 supra and accompanying text. 
50. Revenue Ruling 59-60 (1959-1 CuM. BuLL. 237) indicates that there are at least 
eight relevant factors which may be considered in the evaluation of stock in closely 
held corporations for estate and gift tax purposes. Section 4.01, Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 
CUM. BuLL. 237, 238: 
(a) The nature of the business and the history of the enterprise from its inception. 
(b) The economic outlook in general and the condition and outlook of the specific 
industry in particular. 
(c) The book value of the stock and the financial condition of the business. 
(d) The economic capacity of the company. 
(e) The dividend-paying capacity. 
(f) Whether or not the enterprise has goodwill or other intangible value. 
(g) Size of block factor [which is not relevant for our purposes]. 
(h) The market price of stocks of corporation engaged in the same or a similar 
line of business having their stocks actively traded in a free and open market, 
either on an exchange or over-the-counter. 
See Baltimore Bank v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 642 (D. Md. 1955) (listing 20 factors); 
10 J. MERTENS, I.AW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 59.21-.26 (1943). 
51. For example, in the hypothetical above, the taxpayer would be said to own 
90 percent in value of the outstanding shares. 
52. This test-which results in a numerical count of the shares in the single class 
of stock situation-is consistent with the Ways and Means Committee's hypothetical 
examples (see note 41 supra) explaining the operation of § 1239, examples which can-
not really be squared with the "block value" test. 
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problem of Parker and Trotz in more difficult contexts. Parker was
an easy case for the block value test because the subjective quantifi-
cation of the incremental value, normally necessitated by such a test,
was avoided by the fact that any increase at all pushed the taxpayer
over the 80 percent level. The court in Trotz avoided the quantifica-
tion problem by determining that value is added only when the
transferee is a "going concern." Future courts, regardless of whether
they are faced with the quantification problem,53 should recognize
that the test places improper emphasis on the value of control, and
thus should ask whether the block value is the proper test for section
1239 after all.
53. The subjective determination required by the "block value" test has been
discussed throughout this Note. See text accompanying notes 20-27 supra. Furthermore,
similar "percentage in value" phrases are referred to in seven other sections of the
Internal Revenue Code: §§ 178(b)(2)(B), 179(d)(2)(A), 267(b)(2), 318(2)(c) & (3)(c),
341(e)(8), 503(c) & 1235(d). The "block value" test will certainly be urged for these
other sections where until now it appears that a numerical count test was generally
used. Sea note 46 supra, See also Reilly, An Approach to the Simplification and Stan.
dardization of the Concepts "The F4mily," "Related Parties," "Control," and "Attribu-
tation of Ownership," 15 TAx. L. Rav. 253 (1960).
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